The dog that didn't bark...interpreting non-significance by Kornbrot, D. & Msetfi, R.M.
Presented at International Society for Psychophysics 23rd Annual Meeting, 
Fechner Day 2007, Tokyo, Japan 
THE DOG THAT DIDN’T BARK… INTERPRETING NON SIGNIFICANCE 
Diana Eugenie Kornbrot, Rachel M. Msetfi 
University of Hertfordshire, UK 
d.e.kornbrot@herts.ac.uk, r.msetfi@herts.ac.uk  
Abstract 
Hypothesis testing is a crucial component of science. This leads to guidelines (often ignored) 
in most discipline including psychology. Unfortunately, most focus on significant effects. Non-
significant effects are sidelined, in spite of their importance to scientific progress. This study 
reports a survey of practicing scientist on how they would report and interpret explicit 
scenarios with non-significant effects. There was no consensus on interpretation in terms of 
predicting future results. Respondents agreed about how to report the significance of a 
hypothesis test. Most chose not to report any descriptive statistics, or the sample size, or 
anything about power, or sufficient information to enable replication or meta-. These results 
shed light on statistical thinking and so should enable more useable guidelines. For non-
significant effects, the importance of a priori power is emphasised. 
 
 
“It is impossible to prove a negative, i.e. non-existence of some phenomenon”. Furthermore, 
“falsifiability”, the ability to prove a positive, is claimed to be the very hallmark of science. 
This perception of the nature of science may be one reason that the search for statistically 
significant results appears to dominate empirical research guidelines. Examples of such 
guidelines include: (APA, 2001; Nickerson, 2000; Roberts & Pashler, 2000; Steingrimsson & 
Luce, 2005; Wilkinson, 1999)for psychology; (Duran et al., 2006) for education and 
(Campbell, Elbourne, & Altman, 2004; CONSORT, 2001; QUORUM, 2000; STROBE, 
2005)for medicine. Most guidelines focus on significant results only, and recommend 
reporting effect sizes. Only Nickerson(, 2000) explicitly recommends giving a priori power 
for non-significant results. 
 It is our contention that identifying an absence of difference is one of the most 
important tools of science, both theoretically and practically. In the physical sciences, 
conservation laws (e.g. energy, speed of light ion a vacuum) are cornerstones of theory. For 
psychologist, it is important to establish an absence of difference in the following situations: 
1. when theory predicts equality constraints (Birnbaum, 2004; Steingrimsson & Luce, 2005); 
2. when establishing lack of evidence for harm of beneficial procedure, e.g. the MMR vaccine 
or side effects of drugs; 3. when establishing that an effect is highly improbably, e.g. psycho 
kinesis; and 4. when establishing that controls such as counterbalancing have been successful. 
Power is crucial for all these applications. 
 The current study reports an internet survey on the views of practicing 
scientists on how to report and interpret non-significant results. The aim is a better 
understanding researchers’ perceptions in order to underpin guidelines on non-significance. 
There is continuing evidence that many guidelines are ignored (Cumming et al., 2007).  
Method 
Respondents 
There were 230 respondents who replied to an appeal to 1 of 17 email lists (5 psychological 
methods,  4 statistical packages,   2 statistics 2 hci/surveys; 3 education and 1 history.  
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Materials 
There were 8 versions of the survey (http://web.mac.com/kornbrot/iWeb/statspublic.html). 
Each version comprised two scenarios comparing the proportion of people in 2 groups with 
high blood pressure. The (non-significant) chi-square value and p(null) were also provided. 
Two factors were counterbalanced in the scenarios. GROUPs could be either gender (men, 
women) or video (travel or health). VALUEs could be either high (group1=28%, group 2 = 
38%) or low (group 1=16%, group 2 = 24%). People were also asked for confidence 
judgements for each scenario: in either MAGNITUDE of confidence or AGREE with “I am 
confident” statement. Values for the 1st scenario are shown in Table 1. The 2nd scenario had 
opposite values on each factor. 
Table 1. Values for each factor for 1st Scenario in Survey 
  V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 
Group gender gender gender gender video video video video 
Value low low high high low low high high 
Confidence agree magnitude agree magnitude agree magnitude agree magnitude 
Variables 
Respondents were first  asked how they would REPORT the results to lay and professional 
audiences. The reports were then coded to produce the following response variables: 
descriptive statistics,  inferential statistics,  sample size,  sufficiency,  confidence limits & 
effect size,  odds ratio.  
 Respondents were also asked a multiple-choice question on how they would 
INTERPRET the results in terms of what they would predict for a replication of the same 
study. The choices available were: 1. numbers equal to the original separate group values; 2. a 
number equal to the combined original value; 3. 50%; 4. no prediction possible; and 5. other.  
 Observational explanatory factors were obtained from participant responses as 
to their: DISCIPLINE (coded to 1. biological science, 2. social science, 3. psychology, 
neuroscience, cognitive science or education, 4. statistics, maths, physics, computer science, 
5. not given); ROLE (coded to 1. teaching or teaching + research, 2. research only, 3. not 
given); theoretical STANCE (coded to 1. includes Bayesian approaches, 2. frequentist, 3. 
unfamiliar with Bayes approach); and most common PROCEDURE (1. t-test, 2. ANOVA, 3. 
regression, 4.other). GROUP and VALUE, derived from the survey version described under 
materials, were experimentally manipulated factors. 
Results and Discussion 
The median time was 16.3 minutes,, with 15 taking more than an hour (breaks are possible). 
Some respondents did not progress past the 1st scenario and hence did not provide information 
of role and discipline (43 gave no bio data). Table 2 shows numbers by role and discipline. 
Table 2. Numbers of respondents by role and discipline 
  social science 
biological 
science 
psychology, education, 
cog sci, neuropsy 
statistics, maths, 
phys sci 
teaching + 37 10 23 34 
research only 35 10 10 13 
 
 Likelihood ratio chi-squared tests on contingency tables have been used 
throughout, with a 95% confidence level. The measure of effect size is the contingency 
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coefficient, w = √( χ2/N), with w2 giving a measure of variance accounted for. Power to detect 
medium effects (w = .3) was reasonable, from .79 to .98; but power to detect small effects (w 
= .1) was small, from .15  to .25. The effect sizes that could be detected with power of 0.8 
varied from w = .21 to w = .40, i.e. 4% to 9% variance accounted for. There was no effect of 
GROUP in the scenario or the VALUE of the proportion with blood pressure, or of the order 
in which people saw the scenarios. However, as noted power was ‘modest’ in this exploration. 
REPORT Variables: Coded Free Form Reports to Professional & Lay Audiences 
There were 15 respondents who considered the design so awful that they did not give an 
analyzable response to any ‘how would you report study’. No purpose was given for the 
scenarios and most appeared to  assume that the purpose was to generalize to the adult 
population at large. With hindsight, it would have been better to provide a realistic purpose. 
For example, a concerned local group is considering setting up a healthy living clinic in a 
shopping mall to reduce the prevalence of high blood pressure in the community by providing 
advice, exercise facilities and health promoting videos. Their first concern is the potential 
demand. They also want to pilot a video and estimate separate demands for men and women, 
so as to provide sufficient facilities (e.g. changing rooms for women and men). 
Dichotomising the continuous blood pressure variable was also criticized. 
 Descriptive statistics 
  
 
Figure 1. Percentage choices of descriptive statistics reporting as a function of discipline. 
 
Figure 1 shows the proportion of people choosing each way of reporting the descriptive 
statistics. The most salient feature is that the majority of the 213 respondents chose not to give 
any descriptive statistics at all (57%). The next most popular choice was to give the mean 
proportion for each group separately (29%). There was a significant effect of discipline, LR 
χ2(12) = 23.5, p = .024, effect size w = .33. Post hoc analyses show that statisticians (59%) 
and psychological scientists (51%) were more likely to report some form of descriptive 
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statistics than biologists (25%) or social scientists (35%). There were no statistically 
significant effects of any other factors on the reporting of descriptive statistics. 
 Inferential statistics 
There was far greater consistency in reporting inferential statistics. Only 2.8% gave no 
inferential statistics at all. The majority (85%) reported to professional audiences that the 
difference between groups was not statistically, significant so there was insufficient evidence 
to support a  group difference. However 10.8% who did not want to confuse the public and 
reported to lay audiences baldly that ‘there is no effect”, i.e. non-significant  = no effect. 
There were 2.8% who reported “no effect” even to professional audiences. There were 7% 
who thought the scenario designs were so awful that they would not report at all. There were 
no significant differences according to any explanatory factor. The hypothesis testing culture 
is strongly embedded, for better or worse. 
 Sample size, sufficiency of information, power 
There were no significant effects of any factor on these variables. With 213 participants, 
power to detect a medium effect, w = .3, was  .90 for most common procedure, .95 for 
theoretical stance, .96 for discipline and .98 for role. Effect sizes that could be detected with 
power of 0.8 ranged from w= .24 (4.5% variance) to w = .27 (7.1% variance). 
 Nearly three quarters (73%) chose NOT to provide sample size  in their report 
to professional audiences. This might be because sample size is usually given in the method 
section of a report, so respondents felt it unnecessary to repeat the information in the results. 
 Only 14% gave sufficient information to support meta analysis, or 
equivalently, for future researchers to check whether a replication had produced significantly 
different results. In this case, sample size and χ2 would have been sufficient, since it is 
obvious that df = 1 and p(null) can easily be determined from a spreadsheet. 
 About a quarter (24%) warned that although tests gave no significant effect, 
power was low so an effect was not precluded.   
 Effect size and confidence levels, odds ratios 
Other reporting suggestions included effect sizes and/or confidence limits, and presenting 
odds ratios. The proportion making these suggestions, depended on role  see Fig. 2. 
 
  
Figure 2. Reports of effect sizes/confidence interval (left panel) and odds ratios (right panel)  
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 For effect size/ confidence interval, χ2(6)  = 14.3, p = .024. For odds ratio, , 
χ2(2)  = 6.4, p = .041. Overall, 15% of people made some mention of effect size or confidence 
intervals. Just 7 people suggested odds ratios (3.3%), interesting but not directly relevant to 
non-significance reporting. It appears that having a role in teaching (either with or without 
research) was associated with a greater probability of suggesting both effects sizes/confidence 
intervals and odds ratios. 
INTERPRETATION: prediction of outcome of replication 
The predictions for the 1st and 2nd scenarios were analyzed separately. Anomalous predictions 
(50% or other were dropped from the analyses). This left 199 predictions for scenario 1 and 
165 for scenario 2. The scenario 1 choices were: 38% separate groups, 30% combined groups, 
32% not predictable. The scenario 2 choices were: 34% separate groups, 31% combined 
groups, 35% not predictable. Thus, there is no consensus as to the interpretation of the 
implications of non-significant results for future studies. 
 The only statistically significantly effect was the most common procedure used 
by the respondents, see Fig. 3. For scenario 1, N =170 , χ2(8)  = 14.3, p = .067, w = .27. For 
scenario 2, N =170 , χ2(8)  = 20.0, p = .010, w = .30.  
 
 
Figure 3. The effect of most frequent analysis on predictions of replications. Scenario 1, left 
panel; scenario 2, right panel. 
 
 The respondents who most frequently used a t-test chose ‘not predictable’ most 
often (48%) Those who most frequently used ANOVA chose ‘combined groups’  most often 
(59%). The rest were about equally distributed among the three alternatives. 
Summary 
Informative reporting of non-significant results has a key role to play in theory and practice in 
all areas of science, including psychophysics. Guidelines need to explicitly address the 
reporting of non-significant results. Our recommendation, following Nickerson 2000, would 
be to always give a priori power for non-significant effects. This is the flip side of always  
giving effect size for significant effects. Of course, if there the reporting  is sufficient  by 
inclusion of sample size, descriptive statistics (proportions or mean and s.d.) and inferential 
test-statistics, then the effect sizes and a priori power can be calculated. However, we believe 
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it is a researcher’s responsibility to make these key parts of any empirical study immediately 
salient and available to the reader. 
 Respondents to this survey are obviously committed to sound statistical 
practice. Nevertheless, the focus was clearly more on inference than description. Almost 
everyone reported the result of the hypothesis test. However, only a minority reported 
descriptive statistics of any kind. Furthermore, only a minority reported sufficient information 
for replication. Clearly, in a real scientific Ms. these issues would be addressed. What this 
study shows is that descriptive statistics and sufficient information are not salient to many 
scientists. This is perhaps why guidelines fall on such stony ground. On a more optimistic 
note, perhaps knowing what is salient will help improve future guidelines, and practice.  
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